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THE NAGORNO KARABAKH CONFLICT:  PROBLEMS AND 
POSSIBILITIES FOR POLITICAL RESOLUTION 
 
 by 
 
JESSICA WILLIAMS 
 
(Under the Direction of Emilia Powell) 
 
ABSTRACT 
The argument that democratic states do not go to war with one another, better known by political 
scientists and international relations theorists as the democratic peace proposition, remains one 
of the most difficult to dispute phenomena in state’s relations with one another.  Immanuel Kant 
argued over two hundred years ago that three components were necessary in order for dyads to 
behave peacefully toward one another:  institutionalized democracy, closely intertwined 
economies, and international organizations.  In this thesis, I analyze a specific dyad, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, which in the early 1990s, had a war over the territory of Nagorno Karabakh.  A 
cease-fire was brokered in 1994; however, still in 2009 a political solution is far from being 
rendered.  The thesis will begin with a brief introduction to the Nagorno Karabakh territorial 
dispute as well as a section on democratic peace literature and theory.  In the main chapters, I 
will discuss each leg of the Kantian tripod for peace and the problems and possibilities in 
achieving each of these individual requirements in the Karabakh case.  The paper will conclude 
by examining whether Armenia and Azerbaijan have a chance at realizing democracy. 
 
INDEX WORDS:  Nagorno Karabakh, Democratic Peace Theory, Territorial 
Disputes, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Economic Interdependence, IGOs. 
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CHAPTER 1 
  
THE NAGORNO KARABAKH DISPUTE 
 
Since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the fifteen newly independent countries that succeeded 
it have established political systems varying from extreme authoritarianism to well-established 
democracies.  The three Baltic countries quickly formed democracies while the five Central 
Asian states have been highly authoritarian, theocratic Islamic countries.  Somewhere in the 
middle (probably a bit closer to authoritarian) are the Caucasus states.1  In addition to the 
increased difficulty these state have had democratizing, they also share another common trait:  
all three states have had serious territorial disputes over areas that want to secede from the states 
to which they currently belong.  Last August, Georgia had a somewhat brief war with Russia 
over the separatist region of South Ossetia.2  Another breakaway region, Abkhazia, also wants to 
secede from Georgia and become a part of Russia.  In Azerbaijan, a separatist region called 
Nagorno Karabakh has for years had its own de facto government and soon after the Soviet 
Union fell, war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  It is my contention that in order for 
an eventual peaceful political solution to take place in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan should become institutionalized democracies, and that economic 
interdependence and international organizations can assist in the process. 
Historical Overview of the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict 
Nagorno Karabakh is a mountainous enclave located close to the southwestern border of 
Azerbaijan, where Armenia is located.  It has an area of 8,223 square kilometers and its borders 
are shaped like a kidney bean.  Both Armenia and Azerbaijan argue that they have historical 
                                                 
1 Georgia, while far from being a consolidated democracy, has been more successful at 
democratizing than Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
2 The South Ossettians want to secede from Georgia and become reunited with North Ossetia, 
which, conveniently for Russia, is located above South Ossetia in southern Russia. 
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claims to the Nagorno Karabakh territory.  Armenia claims that Armenians have inhabited this 
area as far back as the fourth century before Christ.  
Various scholars frequently cite different times for the inception of the conflict over 
Karabakh, which is not surprising given the historical animosity felt between Armenians and 
Turkish peoples.  Most scholars seem to associate the time period around the 1920s as the 
beginning of the political conflict over Nagorno Karabakh.  Originally, Armenians were made to 
believe that they would be granted this land, with Soviet Azerbaijan, in December 1920, caving 
into Soviet pressure and issuing a statement that the territory had been transferred over to 
Armenia.  Azerbaijan’s leader Narimanov, later denied that this transfer had taken place, and 
four months later Stalin declared that the territory would remain with Azerbaijan.  This was 
because a treaty provision between the Soviet Union and Turkey mandated that both Nagorno 
Karabakh and Nakhjivan, a region of mostly Azeris completely separated from Azerbaijan in 
Southern Armenia, would belong to Azerbaijan.  Interestingly, on July 4, 1921 a meeting of the 
Caucasus section of the communist party voted in the presence of Stalin to give the territory to 
Armenia, but the following day, Narimanov again protested the decision and it was reversed 
(Cornell 1999).  Armenians were unhappy with this decision and attempts were made throughout 
the Soviet era to have Nagorno Karabakh turned over to Armenia.   
 In the late 1980s the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan became intense, with 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost essentially pouring gasoline on a situation that had 
already been ready to explode for decades.  Widespread demonstrations and protests had began 
to occur, and many Armenians were under the impression that Gorbachev would finally turn 
over Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia.  One of Gorbachev’s economic advisors had even reported 
in a French newspaper that the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) would be 
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transferred over to Armenia in the near future.3  This transfer never took place, however, with 
Gorbachev believing in the sovereignty of borders. 
 On February 26, 1988, rumors began to spread that riots in Stepanakert (the capital of 
Nagorno Karabakh) had led to the death of an Azeri.  As a result, a crowd of Azeris began to 
march on Nagorno Karabakh, marching in columns to the bordering town of Askeran.  Violence 
erupted with the crowd, leaving two Azeris dead.  Upon hearing of the Azeri deaths, violence 
broke out in Sumgait, an industrial suburb in Baku.  An angry group of Azeris looted and burned 
Armenian houses and hunted for Armenians, killing 32 people (26 Armenians and 6 Azeris). 
 After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, full-blown war erupted between Armenians 
and Azeris.  Armenians began conquering Azeris towns and running out all of their inhabitants.  
On February 27, 1992, Armenian forces seized the town of Khojaly.  Ethnic cleansing took place 
in Khojaly, with a large number of its 7,000 citizens being mutilated and killed.  Those who were 
not killed became refugees (Cornell 1999). 
 A number of pogroms continued to take place up until 1994 when Russia mediated a 
cease-fire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  At this point, the explosive violence 
subsided; however, 15 years after the cease-fire was declared, a political solution to the conflict 
has yet to be found.  Armenia still controls seven additional districts in Azerbaijan, including an 
area called the Lachin Corridor, a stretch of land connecting Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia.  
The war has taken over 30,000 lives and led to over 1,000,000 refugees losing their homes.   
 One of the most debilitating factors in resolving the crisis has been leadership in both 
 
                                                 
3Nagorno Karabakh, during Soviet rule, was considered an “Autonomous Oblast.”  The Soviet 
Union created administrative units for some of the smaller states, which were granted autonomy.  
After the Soviet Union collapsed, Azerbaijan removed Nagorno Karbakh’s autonomous status.  
South Ossetia, in Georgia, was also given autonomous status by the Soviets. 
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countries that have been unwilling to truly consider a compromise.  At one point, Nagorno 
Karabakh was given every benefit of a sovereign state except this title of ownership, but 
Armenia would not consent.  On October 15, 2008, Azerbaijan “reelected” Ilham Aliev to the 
presidency.  In the years since Aliev has been president, he has been unwavering in his 
commitment to retain sovereignty over Karabakh, and running for president, he promised the 
Azerbaijani people that he would never recognize an independent Nagorno Karabakh.  During 
his inauguration on October 24, he said “Karabakh will never be independent.  Azerbaijan will 
never recognize it.  Neither in five years, nor in 10, 20 years  Never”  (Fuller 2008).  The recent 
election of Armenian president Serzh Sarkisian, however, is perhaps the most promising hope of 
resolving the conflict thus far.  Despite Aliev’s remarks, new talks have begun between Sarkisian 
and Aliev.  Sarkisian has shown openness in the past month to a deal based on the “Madrid 
Principles,” which were presented in 2006 by Minsk Group co-chairmen France, Russia, and the 
United States.  Many parties within the Armenian government are furious with Sarkisian over the 
consideration of this compromise, but if it is agreed upon, Armenians would withdraw from the 
seven territories that they control, as well as the Lachin corridor, which provides a trade route 
from Armenia to Nagorno Karabakh.  In addition, international peacekeepers would be brought 
in and internationally displaced persons would be free to return to their homes. 
Current Theory and Literature on the Democratic Peace 
 Over 200 years ago, Immanuel Kant proposed the idea that countries with 
institutionalized democracies have peaceful relationships with other democracies and are 
generally much less likely to go to war than non-democratic countries.  Kant’s proposition for 
how to eliminate conflict between states encompassed three principles: 1) democratization, 2) 
Economic interdependence, and 3) International Organizations.  Since this concept originated, 
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the democratic peace has become one of the most frequently debated theories in International 
Relations.  Scholars claim that the democratic peace is the closest we have come to realizing an 
empirical truth in how states behave toward other states, at least in the twentieth century. 
 John Oneal and Bruce Russett (2001) have conducted numerous studies examining the 
validity of the democratic peace proposition.  They find strong support in their analyses that 
democratic countries are less likely to engage in violent behavior with other states.  Even after 
controlling for economic interdependence and involvement in the same international 
governmental organizations, the authors found that democracies are 33 percent less likely to 
engage in a militarized dispute than the average dyad .  They also found that if both states in a 
dyad are democratic, the likelihood of a fatal dispute is 86 percent less than if at least one of the 
states is an autocracy  
 Dixon (1993) also finds that democracy has a systematic positive impact on conflict 
management.  He argues that the democratic peace works because states have mutually held 
beliefs of bounded competition.  Dixon and Senese (2002) argue that adherence to norms allows 
states in a conflict to communicate effectively so that minimal consideration of a dispute 
settlement can become possible.  Disputes between democratic states are more likely to result in 
some type of procedural accommodation than between states that operate under different 
normative guidelines.  The result of shared norms will be that states will be more likely to 
negotiate and come to a mutually agreeable solution. 
 Like Oneal, Russett, and Dixon’s studies, Werner (2000) also finds evidence to support 
democratic peace.  While democratic peace theory holds that democratic states are less likely to 
go to war than non-democratic states, Werner concludes that in dyads consisting of two different 
types of regimes, the chances of conflict will be much higher.  Werner’s hypothesis may be 
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related to normative theory as well.  She claims that states that manage their domestic affairs 
differently are more likely to have disagreements than states that manage their affairs in a similar 
way.  Werner runs several models in which she finds robust support that politically similar states 
are less likely to have conflicts with one another.  Her results are statistically significant, with p 
typically being at the .001 level.  Increasing the degree of political similarity from the minimum 
observed to the maximum observed increases the expected duration of peace by as much as 130 
years. 
 Her analysis also developed a variety of other conclusions worth noting.  Like other 
studies that provide evidence for democratic peace, Werner found that two democracies will 
probably have up to 64 more years of peace than other combinations of dyads.  She came to the 
same conclusions as many other scholars that geographically distant states are more likely to be 
peaceful toward one another than contiguous states.  She also found that states with a history of 
conflict were much more likely to experience a future dispute than a state without a conflictive 
past.  If the rate of past disputes increases to one dispute every three years, the duration of peace 
will be 33 years shorter.  She also finds that distribution of power in a dyad is unrelated to the 
chances of conflict (Werner 2000). 
 Oneal and Russett (1997) show similar findings.  Their results reveal that political 
 
distance between two states in a dyad causes more conflict than a dyad in which the two states 
are politically similar.  Oneal and Russett did a logistic regression analysis that found that the 
likelihood of a dispute between the two democracies, all else being equal, is .071, whereas it is 
.137 for a democracy combined with an autocracy. 
 Work has also been done on regime type and the effect that a change in the type of 
regime would have on conflict between states.  Enterline (1998) looks at three regime types 
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between 1816-1992- democratic, anocratic, and autocratic- and tests the likelihood that states 
transitioning to these regimes will be the initiators of militarized disputes.  He found that a state 
transitioning to democracy had no effect on its chances of being the initiator of a militarized 
dispute.  States transitioning to autocracies, however, had a much higher probability that they 
would initiate disputes.  Enterline found that states transitioning to autocracy had a 24 percent 
higher probability of threatening, displaying, or using military force against another state.   
 Oneal and Russett (2003) report similar results as those of Enterline.  These authors find 
that democratization quickly reduces the risk that conflict will arise between states.  Well 
established democracies are less likely to enter into conflict than newly formed democracies, 
(established democracies have a probability of conflict at .0012) but even new democracies have 
a much lower risk of conflict than non-democracies; Oneal and Russett claim, however, that it 
only takes seven years of democratic governance to achieve the same reduction of conflict that is 
enjoyed by a pair of fully formed democratic states. 
Democratization is often proscribed as a remedy for preventing conflict because, as 
Dixon suggests, it can result in the development of shared norms, one of which is that states 
attempt every mode of settling a dispute possible before resorting to violence.  Mitchell (2002) 
argues that as more democracies are formed, international norms will develop, and third party 
conflict resolution will become more likely.  Third party settlement is 16 times more likely for 
non-democracies when the proportion of democracies in the international system is 50% than 
when the proportion is zero. 
 Mitchell (1999) examines the relationship between regime type, issues at stake, and the 
likelihood of militarized dispute between 1946-1992.  Her analysis reveals that established 
democracies are able to eliminate territorial disputes as contentious issues with other well-
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established democracies.  One-third of ninety-seven cases Mitchell looked at (coming from the 
Militarized Interstates Dispute dataset) were coded as territorial disputes.  Of these disputes, only 
two were fought between institutionalized democracies.  She also found, however, that poorly 
established democracies were more likely to have militarized disputes over territory.  Forty-two 
percent of these disputes involved less established democracies.  Like Mitchell, Mousseau (2000) 
also found robust results that the more developed a democracy is, the lower the probability of 
conflict.  
Economic Interdependence 
 In addition to democratization, liberal theorists argue that economic interdependence 
between states will help minimize international conflict.  Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001) did a 
large study in which they found that interdependence has a positive impact on conflict.  These 
authors argue that interdependence enables states to demonstrate resolve without having to resort 
to military violence.  Liberal states, they argue, are more able to address the informational 
problems that result in costly contests.  This is because they are able to communicate credibly 
through costly signals without using violent forms of conflict.  Signals through economic 
interdependence cause states to be less likely to address problems violently. 
 Mousseau (2000) reports a link between market prosperity and conflict reduction.  
Mousseau’s hypothesis that wealthier states would be less conflict prone was largely based on 
the notion of cultural materialism, (Murphy and Margolis 1995) that even states that have very 
little in common yet share common economic systems will share the same norms as other 
developed states such as the U.S. and other Western states. 
  Oneal and Russett (1997) also found robust support for their prediction that  
interdependence would result in lower instances of conflict.  All of their tests, even when  
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controlling for geographical contiguity, balance of power, alliances, and economic growth rates  
showed that economically important trade caused lower instances of militarized disputes and 
war. 
 Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) formed an argument based on what they call 
Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA’s), a broad class of institutions that include free trade, 
common markets, and custom unions.  Their research reveals that states that belong to the same 
PTA’s are much less likely to enter into a dispute than states that do not have this trade 
relationship.  Mansfield and Pevehouse found that for states not belonging to the same PTA, 
there was only a weak relationship between trade and disputes.  For those who were in the same 
PTA, these states were much less prone to enter into disputes, an effect that grows larger as the 
flow of trade becomes greater.  Therefore, in their analysis, it is not so much that any form of 
trade between states causes peace but rather that the states belong to a larger system of trade. 
International Organizations 
 The third area that is supposed to prevent conflict from occurring between states is the 
influence of international organizations.  Russett, Oneal, and Davis (1998) support this theory.  
In an analysis of dyads between 1950-1985, they found that increasing the number of shared 
intergovernmental organizations by a standard deviation reduces the incidence of militarized 
conflict by 23 percent from the baseline rate for the typical dyad.  Interestingly, they found that 
there were very strong advantages to states combining Kantian variables of economic 
interdependence, Democracy, and membership of the same IGO’s.  States that meet all three of 
these criteria have their likelihood of engaging in a dispute decreased by 72 percent.  There is 
also a reciprocal benefit that democratic and economically interdependent states were more 
likely to join the same IGO’s.  
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 Not only has research been done showing that belonging to the same international 
organizations decreases the likelihood of conflict, Mitchell and Hensel (2002) found that it also 
increases the likelihood that states will comply with agreements once they are made.  They found 
that virtually every agreement reached with the assistance of an international organization was 
carried out by both parties.  Only two-thirds of agreements made without the help of an IO are 
complied with, however.  The authors found that when both parties are members of at least one 
global organization such as the UN or the League of Nations, they were much more likely to 
comply with their agreements with three quarters of these agreements being carried out as 
opposed to two-thirds when they are not members of a global organization.  Involvement in the 
same regional organizations also causes states to be more likely to uphold their agreements 
(p<.005). 
 The overarching argument of this paper is that the three components of the Kantian tripod 
of democratic peace (democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations) are 
the most promising strategy by which a peaceful political solution to the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict can be achieved; institutionalized democracy may, in fact, be the only way to ever come 
to an agreement that will not reignite another war.  In this paper I will provide support, based on 
previous empirical research, for how each of the three legs of the Kantian tripod can have a 
positive impact on peaceful political resolution between the disputants.  From here, I will analyze 
the ways in which these elements of democratic peace can be achieved and the internal and 
external problems that will work against the democratic peace being built in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.   
International relations theories may provide some explanations for the possibility of 
eventual democratization and peaceful political resolution of the territorial dispute.  Democracy 
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could be effective in pushing Armenia and Azerbaijan toward a political solution because 
democracies tend to accept norms seen as democratic.  These norms include an emphasis on the 
need to settle disputes with other states and to do so peacefully, as well as the imperative that 
human rights always be protected.  Democracy usually is accompanied with benefits such as 
greater international acceptance, economic advantages, an acquired reputation that will lead to 
greater acceptance into international organizations, multilateral treaty agreements, etc.   
Rational choice theory may explain the reasons that democratic peace is so successful, 
and why, if Armenia and Azerbaijan become democratic, they will be less likely to fight again 
and more likely to work out a compromise.  Rational choice theory suggests that states are 
rational actors that make choices based on perceived costs and benefits.  If rational choice theory 
is accurate, it becomes much easier to understand why democratic states are more peaceful and 
cooperative with one another.  Democratic states may be said to belong to a club in which its 
members are entitled to certain benefits.  Of course, to be part of any club one must conform to 
certain beliefs and behaviors, but there is some type of reward received in return.  In the case of 
democracy, the rewards are extensive and include the wide array of economic, international, and 
security benefits previously mentioned.  To fail to conform to the rules of the club means losing 
one’s standing, if not being kicked out altogether.  The costs of not complying with the groups’ 
norms is extremely high, whereas the advantages of upholding the norms are worthwhile.  If 
Armenia and Azerbaijan can ever form institutionalized democracies, it would be in their direct 
interest to make a real effort to solve the Nagorno Karabakh dispute, since consequences for not 
doing so would be extremely high and rewards for doing so would be significant. 
Achieving democracy means Armenia and Azerbaijan must first develop norms 
associated with democracy.  This will be a major hurdle since it would require identity shifts in 
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both countries.  A change in identity and thus norms cannot happen under the corrupt leadership 
that is currently in place.  From a realist point of view, the leadership in both countries will likely 
try to prevent democracy in order to retain the power that they already have, since 
democratization means elected officials will not have permanent and unrestricted power.  
However, it is also important that amassing the many benefits that would come with 
democratization would mean that states themselves would become more powerful within the 
international system.  
I will pose the argument that the best way for Armenia to Azerbaijan to come to a 
political solution to the Nagorno Karabakh problem is for both states to move toward 
institutionalized democracies.  A quicker solution will be made if countries in the surrounding 
region also become more democratic and if the countries that already are democratic (Turkey and 
Georgia) forge closer relationships with the two disputing states with the goal of influencing 
norms. I also argue that democratization creates a higher probability that the disputing parties 
will seek legal dispute settlement methods, and if this occurs, they have a high chance of 
accepting the legal bodies’ decision. 
 It is also necessary for Armenia and Azerbaijan to become interdependent with one 
another as well as with their nearby region in order to come to a settlement at some point.  
Opening up a broader range of trade relationships with a greater number of states in the region 
will help counterbalance Russian influence and will help both countries create common alliances 
that will help to smooth over relations.  I argue that Turkey, as well as Azerbaijan, will need to 
remove their trade embargoes on Armenia. 
 Last, international organizations will need to play a role in fostering both economic and 
democratic development, as well as being a liaison that will use its influence to promote 
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cooperation between countries in the region.  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), the primary organization at this point mediating the Nagorno Karabakh dispute, 
must step up its efforts at pushing democratization in Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as 
throughout the region.  The European Union is also a needed tool in the process of moving 
toward a resolution since it, too, can push for democratization.  More important, however, the 
EU can use accession to its organization as leverage to persuade Turkey to reopen trade relations 
with Armenia, acknowledge the Armenian genocide, and to become a fair mediator in the 
dispute.  Turkey, as a democracy itself, can have a major influence on the disputants’ political 
systems if it attempts to smooth over its relations with Armenia.  I argue that economic regional  
interdependence and increased democratization will both result in higher costs for the disputing 
parties if they fail to make real and genuine efforts to find a political solution to their conflict.   
 Furthermore, Armenia and Azerbaijan will be more likely to come to a viable solution if 
they both are active members of the same international organizations that make democratization, 
economic interdependence, and peaceful resolution of dispute major objectives.  I pose that like  
democracy and economic interdependence, belonging to similar IGOs with these objectives will 
enforce norms that encourage settling disputes and doing so peacefully.   
 I expect that previous research will provide empirical evidence to support the idea that 
democracy is the best option in bringing about an eventual settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict and the best method for ensuring that the two states do not resort to war after an 
agreement is made.  I also hypothesize that studies will show economic interdependence as 
having a strong impact on peaceful dispute resolution and that international organizations will 
play a powerful role in pushing democracy and interdependence, as well as peaceful dispute 
resolution.  All of these components will establish regional norms of peaceful conflict resolution.  
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CHAPTER 2   
 
DEMOCRATIZATION: THE FIRST STEP ON THE PATH TO POLITICAL RESOLUTION 
 
 A number of attempts have been made to formulate an acceptable political solution to the 
Nagonro Karabakh problem, but thus far none of the solutions that have been developed have 
been accepted by both parties involved in the dispute.  One proposal that has been suggested for 
a political solution to the conflict is the idea of a territorial exchange between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.  Azerbaijan could cede Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia and, in return Armenia could 
give Azerbaijan an area known as Zanzezur, which is located in southernmost part of Armenia.  
As discussed in the historical section of chapter one, Nakhjivan belongs to Azerbaijan, but is 
located in southern Armenia, completely separate from Azerbaijan.  Zanzezur is a strip of land 
connecting Nakhjivan and Azerbaijan, but belongs to Armenia.  On the surface, this might seem 
to be a valuable solution to both parties involved, but Armenia has refused to consider this 
option, and for understandable reasons.  Since Nakhjivan and Zanzezur combined make up 
Armenia’s entire southern border, ceding Zanzezur would cut off Armenia from its second best 
ally, Iran.  Armenia’s economic situation is already vulnerable since Azerbaijan and Turkey both 
cut off economic ties with Armenia.  To give up a strong the strong alliance it has with Iran 
would seriously damage its economy.  In addition, Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh citizens do 
not limit their demands to the Karabakh territory itself, but refuse to accept any deal that does not 
include the Lachin corridor, a stretch of land that connects Armenia to Nagorno Karabakh.  The 
Nagorno Karabakh region alone, given that it is already probably more than twice the size of  
Nakhjivan, would mean that Azerbaijan would be making a larger concession than Armenia. A 
trade that included the Lachin corridor as well would be unthinkable.  Not surprisingly, while 
Azerbaijan has been open to the basic territorial swap of Nagorno Karabakh for Nakhjivan, it 
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will not even consider giving up the Lachin corridor as well4 (Cornell 1999). 
 John Maresca (1994) has formulated a proposal that would call for joint sovereignty over 
Nagorno Karabakh.  His plan calls for Nagorno Karabakh being renamed the Republic of 
Nagorno Karabakh, which would have its own government and legal system and would be 
“freely associated with Azerbaijan.”  All displaced persons would be able to return to their 
homes and Armenia and Azerbaijan would both be designated as free trade areas, with both 
states agreeing upon mutual transit rights between the two countries.  Last, the United States, 
OSCE, and UN Security Council would invest in reconstruction of the corridors connecting 
Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia and Nakhjivan to Azerbaijan.  Cornell (1999) claims that this 
plan is unlikely and even potentially dangerous because, while Armenia and Azerbaijan could be 
forced to comply with the arrangement, it is likely that violence would become renewed.  In 
order for this plan to be successful, the two countries must have strong, healthy relations with 
one another, since mutual trust is mandatory.  Today, the level of trust necessary to resort to a 
plan like this is still not even close to being realized.  However, if both states democratized, 
slowly began opening up trade and diplomatic relations, and international organizations became 
involved helping them do so, eventually this might be a realistic plan.  Both countries have a 
long way to go before a progressive plan like this will be feasible. 
More broadly, there has been debate over whether to come to political settlement by 
looking at a package deal or using a step-by-step approach.  A package deal would call for an 
immediate solution to be agreed upon, whereas a step-by-step approach would call for parties to 
                                                 
4 Nakhjivan is a homogeneously Azerbaijani populated area and has never been a disputed 
territory.  Thus Azerbaijan will not give up this territory (Cornell 1999).  Furthermore, 
strategically, the Lachin corridor has assisted Armenia in providing military aid and weapons to 
Nagorno Karabakh, which would be legitimate reason for Azerbaijan to be hesitant about giving 
over legal rights to the territory to Armenia. 
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agree upon incremental steps that would in the end result in some type of political solution 
(which would not be determined at the beginning of the step-by-step process).  The question over 
which of these two formulas for resolution will be used has, more than anything else, enabled 
both Azerbaijan and Armenia to stall the mediation process.  In regards to whether to use a 
package or step-by-step approach, as well as other specific plans, Armenia and Azerbaijan have 
pretended to be interested in various resolutions, but in reality all of their “attempts” have been 
insincere.  The most promising way for this behavior to end and a genuine effort at settlement to 
occur is for democratization to take place. 
 Perhaps the most significant reason that democratization would be advantageous to 
Armenia and Azerbaijan is that it will help the parties mold their own behavior to norms that 
have been embraced by other democratic states.  Among these democratic norms is the belief 
that democracies are able to settle their differences peacefully as well as the idea of respect for 
human rights.  When coming to a political solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, it is 
essential that the agreement does not result in the war between the disputing parties being 
reignited.  Dixon and Senese (2002) reported evidence to support the democratic peace theory 
works because democratic parties have mutually held beliefs of bounded competition.  They find 
that states perceive it as a norm to cooperate with one another rather than attack.  If norms 
develop within the disputing parties’ states that cause Armenia and Azerbaijan to feel intense 
pressure to conform to perceived democratic principles, the chances that these countries will  
choose to find a peaceful political solution that results in the approximately 800,000 refugees 
that have lost their homes being able to return will increase dramatically.   
 Currently, Armenia and Azerbaijan are attempting (in the mildest sense of the word) to 
arrive at a political solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict through the mediating efforts of  
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the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  Another benefit of 
democratization is that there is a much greater chance that both Armenia and Azerbaijan will 
choose to move away from informal methods of conflict resolution and opt to take the Nagorno 
Karabakh dispute to adjudication.   
Adjudication would be beneficial to both states’ presidents, enabling them to resolve the 
conflict but, at the same time, protect themselves from the public scorn they would undergo if the 
governments agreed on a solution that was not the desired outcome.  Huth and Allee (2006) pose 
a “political cover” argument in which they provide very strong support for the hypothesis that 
democratic leaders are much more likely than leaders that are not democratic to solve disputes 
through legal means of dispute resolution.  They find that when disputants are both democratic 
and face strong domestic opposition, and when the dispute is salient to domestic audiences, legal 
dispute resolution is more likely.  All of their variables relating to political cover were 
statistically significant at either the .01 or .05 levels.   
Their results here are highly relevant in the cases of Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Both 
presidents face an enormous amount of pressure from citizens to solve the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict in their favor and are mostly unwilling to compromise.  The fact that the Nagorno 
Karabakh dispute is based on a centuries old ethnic claim to territory makes the dispute 
extremely salient.  If Huth and Allee’s (2006) findings are accurate, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
would be strong candidates for states that will seek Adjudication or Arbitration if they become 
democratic.  Also, currently in Azerbaijan, there is no reason for Aliev to try to solve the 
Nagorno Karabakh issue since the country is effectively a monarchy with illegitimate elections.  
Aliev will be re-elected regardless of whether the conflict is solved, and up to this point, 
preserving the status quo has served him well.  If a democratic system is put into place, a leader 
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might feel more comfortable using legal methods of dispute resolution, especially if this leader is 
in his or her last term in office and can save face by having a supposedly unbiased court judge 
the dispute. 
It is also possible that rather than using the legal dispute method of adjudication, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan might choose arbitration.  Arbitration might be more desirable for leaders of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan because of the salience of the dispute to both sides.  Both disputants 
strongly wish to win and arbitration would have the benefit of enabling them to select an 
arbitrator to represent them.  In their cases, both countries would likely ask their greatest allies to 
arbitrate, which would be Turkey on Azerbaijan’s side and Iran on Armenia’s side. 
The United States would probably be the likely choice for the third arbitrator by both 
disputants.  The U.S. is the only state playing a role in the dispute that has not taken a clear 
position strictly for one party or the other.  Due to the very powerful Armenian lobby in 
Congress, the United States legislature has taken a strong pro-Armenian position; in the Freedom 
Support Act, Congress passed bill 907, which prevented aid from going into Azerbaijan.  Despite 
the United States Congress’ position, the executive branch has taken the opposite stance, more 
than likely because of the oil found in Azerbaijan, which is located in the Caspian Sea.  The 
executive branch’s tilt toward Azerbaijan may be even stronger than it was in the 1990s because 
of the new importance that is being placed on finding sources of energy without relying on the 
Middle East.  In arguing why the United States did not go into Iraq for oil-related reasons, Roy 
(2008) notes that the only time in which the United States politically intervened in the oil sphere 
was in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (which detours Russia and Iran).  The goal, he claims, 
was to help make the oil market more fluid (18).  Bill Clinton made repeated efforts during his  
administration to have Congress overturn its bill against Azerbaijan, but only minor 
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changes have ever been made.  George Bush has had Heydar Aliev as a guest at the White 
House. 
Because of the double-edged stance of the United States government, the disputing 
parties might feel that they have the best chance of winning through arbitration in which the U.S. 
is the third mediator.  This might still be a stretch since disputants like to think they have more 
than a chance of winning, but in a highly fragile political stalemate that desperately needs to be 
resolved, a fairly good chance of a positive outcome is much more promising than a very 
possible negative one.  Democratization may also enforce norms that push Armenia and 
Azerbaijan to try to make real attempts to solve the Nagorno Karabakh issue.  Raymond’s (1994) 
research provides strong support for his theory that extremely war-prone and democratic dyads 
are much more likely to resort to arbitration as their mechanism for dispute settlement.  
Raymond found that when democratic dyads between 1820-1965 referred a dispute to a third 
party, they tended to go with binding third-party mediation.  He also found that rough parity in 
military capabilities usually results in the dispute going to binding arbitration, which applies to 
the dispute over Nagorno Karabakh since there is a major power imbalance between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan.  Hensel (2001), Allee and Huth (2006), Simmons (1999), and Powell and 
Wiegand (2009) also argue that legal dispute resolution is more likely when there is power 
parity.   
Some political scientists make the argument that states are more likely to find a solution 
to a dispute immediately following or during a serious militarized dispute, especially if it results 
in a large loss of lives or a state knows it will not win a dispute.  Maresca (1996) takes the 
position that much greater efforts needed to be made during or right after the war over Nagorno 
Karabakh, but the ripeness of the conflict was not taken advantage of by those mediating.  
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Although some scholars would argue that solutions are most likely during or right after a dispute, 
it is unlikely that a political solution would result if violence was ever renewed.  Moreover, 
renewed conflict could have severe negative consequences.  The previous violent conflict that 
ended in 1994 led a very large number of Azeris to flee to neighboring Iran, causing fear on the 
part of Iranians on account of such a large number of secular Muslims inhabiting their territory.  
Reignited conflict could lead to extremely hostile relations between Iran and Azerbaijan if 
another wave of secular Muslims fled to Iran. 
Other factors may be important in choosing to move toward democracy.  It is critical, for 
example, that both disputing states transform into democracies, since a dyad consisting of one 
democracy and one autocracy has a much higher likelihood of war. Oneal and Russett (1997) 
found that the probability of conflict for a contiguous dyad consisting of two autocracies is .071 
whereas the probability for conflict in a dyad consisting of a democratic and autocratic state is 
.137.  Based on these results, the disputing parties would be less likely to enter into conflict in 
their present situation than if one country democratizes and the other does not.  If an imbalance 
such as this did take place with only one country becoming democratic, it is likely that the 
democratic country would come out successfully.  However, given the volatile region 
surrounding Armenia and Azerbaijan, this is an undesirable option.  
Russia and the Prospects for Democratization 
 Russian interference could pose a major obstacle to democratization in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.  This is particularly the case in Armenia where Russia has a high degree of leverage 
it can use against Armenia due to Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia.  Despite 
Azerbaijan currently being more authoritarian than Armenia, democratization might be easier 
since it consistently makes decisions independent of Russian influence and because it has very 
 26
friendly relations with western democratic powers.  If democratization does come about, which 
is only possible with economic growth and interdependence and strong efforts by international 
organizations, Armenian and Azerbaijan may be able to disentangle themselves from excessive 
Russian influence, which makes democracy, and therefore a peaceful political solution much 
more likely. 
 During the course of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, Russia was only interested in a 
solution to the conflict if it brokered the resolution.  Efforts made by the CSCE were repeatedly 
impeded by Russia.  Maresca (1996) claims that it became clear to the CSCE that “it was 
Russia’s deliberate intention not to cooperate, thus to ensure that its own proposal would be 
understood by the parties to be the only game in town, and ultimately supplant the negotiating 
process.”  Beyond undermining attempts at conflict resolution, Nolyain (1994) argues that the 
Soviet Union consciously initiated the dispute.  He claims that in during the Sumgait massacre, 
in which 32 people were killed, a massive Soviet militia was present and heavily armed, but 
made no effort at all to suppress the massacre.  Russian military simply stood by and watched the 
pogrom take place.  He also states that the Soviet Union provide addresses to the houses in which 
Armenians lived and that afterward the Soviet Union intentionally used the media as a method of 
manipulating the Sumgait massacre to its own ends. 
 Furthermore, in the time since the 1994 cease-fire, Russia could have made attempts to 
help Armenia and Azerbaijan come to a political solution to the Nagorno Karabakh problem, but 
has not tried to do so, probably because an ongoing problem plays into its desire to have a 
presence in the region.  Ironically, immediately following Russia’s war with Georgia in August 
2008 (which in itself shows that peace is low in the Russian agenda) it suddenly began making 
attempts to help mediate a political solution to the conflict.  To no surprise, the plan being 
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discussed now would call for a major peacekeeping effort to which Russia would assume the 
primary role.  Azerbaijan, which has adamantly refused any Russian presence in its territory 
since its independence, would for the first time have Russians on its land (RFE citation). 
 Russia’s past and present behavior proves that it is more a threat to both democratization 
and political solution than an asset.  Even if Russia was to negotiate a political solution that 
resulted in peace between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Nagorno Karabakh people, the current 
issue of territorial sovereignty could likely shift to an even larger one between Azerbaijan and 
Russia, which would create a dangerous situation with neighboring Iran.   
 Preventing any Russian influence in the countries nearby would be altogether impossible, 
and a workable solution would be very difficult without any Russian support.  However, if 
Armenia and Azerbaijan both grow economically (without there being disproportionate wealth) 
and international organizations begin to play a much greater role, Russian influence could at 
least be counterbalanced, making democratization possible.  Nevertheless, it is very clear that the 
greatest feat that the disputing parties will have to overcome in order to democratize and find a 
political solution is the northern giant, which will no doubt do everything in its power to retain 
control of the Southern Caucasus. 
Internal Obstacles and Prospects for Democratization 
 Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have significant hurdles they must overcome before real 
democratization will occur.  One might think that Azerbaijan has a lower chance than Armenia at 
a shift to democracy; it should not be underestimated the obstacles Armenia will have to 
overcome before change will take place.  A number of factors currently prevent Armenia from 
democratizing. 
 Corruption plays an enormous role in the Armenian political climate.  After the 1994 
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cease-fire the Armenian National Movement (ANM), which was the ruling party, tried to secure 
its own power in order to cash in on personal power and wealth at the expense of the Armenian 
people (Welt and Bremmer 1997).  Freire and Simão (2007, 3) say that leaders used “shock 
therapy” measures that allowed a ruling minority to hold most of the wealth, which led to social 
polarization and widespread corruption. 
 These authors also note shortcomings in the construction of the constitution and the 
judiciary system.  Armenia’s 1995 constitution calls for excessive centralization, which gives the 
president wide ranging powers, including the ability to declare a state of emergency or terminate 
individual freedoms.  He can dissolve Armenia’s unicameral national assembly, and can freely 
appoint and remove government ministers, judges, and state prosecutors.  A 1996 law also gave 
the president the power to appoint governors (Welt and Bremmer 1997).  Freire and Simão 
(2007) suggest that a major impediment to democratization is that Armenia has a very politicized 
judiciary.  For example, they say that a serious incident occurred in 1999 in which Vezgen 
Sarkisian and other politicians (including a presidential candidate) were shot by a gunman who 
entered the parliamentary building.  Recently an attempt was made to assassinate the mayor of 
Yerevan as well.  Neither these acts nor other political crimes were ever brought to the judicial 
system.  This also likely speaks of political elites exercising control over law enforcement as 
well.  The authors go on to claim that in a 2004 Armenian survey, only 12% of people thought  
that political power did not play a role in the judiciary.  All of these factors will have an effect on 
whether Armenians deem their government to be legitimate.   
 Geographic and cultural features of Armenia itself work against democracy.  Sahakyan 
and Atanesyan (2006) say that a large number of Armenians live in its capital, Yerevan, but the 
remainder of the population is spread out in very rural towns of which people’s identities are 
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constructed by the clans or tribes to which they belong.  Citizens of these rural villages do not 
take into account issues, political parties, or frequently, even the level of education candidates 
have when deciding who they will vote for in elections.  Rather, they talk to people from their 
village and select a person they think is deserving of respect.  Family relations also play a major 
role in elections.  A person who votes against his or her own relative is seen as dishonoring the 
entire community.  Violence, which is supported by police and governors, is also often used as a 
means of getting candidates elected. 
 Armenians also suffer from a lack of trust of any major ideology that is pushed upon 
them.  In their minds, the Soviet Union forced the Communist ideology upon them to make 
Armenians yield to Soviet interests and now they feel that another ideology, democracy, is being 
forced upon them.  Sahakyan and Atanesyan argue that Armenians are suspicious of “big ideas” 
promoted from outsiders; this is particularly true of democracy since those who support in do so 
because they claim that human rights will be upheld in a democracy, yet Armenians have not  
seen defense for human rights since their country “democratized.”  Even in 2008, the country is 
still rife with violations of trafficking women and girls for sexual exploitation and men and boys  
for forced labor.  This is also a prevalent issue in Azerbaijan.  Both countries have failed to make 
an attempt to find or jail these offenders (CIA World Fact book, 2008). 
 The greatest challenge to real democratization in Azerbaijan is forging a new and 
democratic system out of a current one that is highly authoritarian.  Heydar Aliev was accepted 
as president of Azerbaijan, despite his authoritarian style, because Azerbaijanis wanted stability 
over democracy (particularly in the aftermath of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict).  Aliev was able 
to provide this stability.  In addition, he was credited with strengthening a severely devastated 
economy by attracting oil companies to the country, improving Azerbaijan’s standing in the 
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international community, and creating the foundation for a modern army (Cornell 2001).  
Corruption, as with Armenia, plays a prominent role in the political system.  One of Azerbaijan’s 
biggest obstacles is creating a free and fair system of electing presidents and parliamentarians.  
As mentioned previously, Heydar Aliev’s son, Ilham is now president, largely based on the god-
like status his father has come to hold among citizens.  Although the election of Ilham was 
massively rigged and his father deliberately made successful efforts to change the constitution to 
help him become elected, it remains widely accepted that he would have won anyway, albeit to 
slightly lesser margin.  Azerbaijan’s 2005 elections included violence against opposition figures, 
blackmail, and arrests.  Races were fixed in 111 of 125 voting districts and were cancelled 
altogether in ten (Valiyev 2006).  The recent election of Ilham Aliev to his second five-year term 
this year was, not surprisingly, also deemed fraudulent from the perspective of election officials 
and international organizations overseeing the election. 
 Given the current political climate of Azerbaijan, it will be a difficult task to successfully  
establish democratic norms either in the government or with the people.  The extensive benefits 
of wealth and power those in the government are accustomed to will make it very difficult to  
create a path to democracy.  While acknowledging the difficult task ahead, Azerbaijan may have 
several advantages that place them at greater odds for democratization than Armenia has.   
 First, Ilham Aliev has recently began his final term as president, so in five years a new 
election will take place.  This gives international organizations a great opportunity to step up 
efforts at working with Azerbaijan in formulating norms.  It is highly possible that Ilham Aliev 
will do as his father and try to pass his power down to someone else in his own family, especially 
since several other family members have positions in the parliament; however, the next five  
years is the time to prevent a permanent monarchical style ruling system to take shape.  If 
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another Aliev takes office in the next election, this pattern may not be alterable.   
 Also, an advantage Azerbaijan may have of democratizing is that it has had a relatively 
recent attempt at democratization.  During the early 1990s, Albufaz Elcibey became president of 
Azerbaijan in the only democratic election the country has had.  Elcibey originally came to 
power through a coup d’état, but wanted to move the country to a democratic system, and held 
democratic elections where he was elected by a margin of 60%.  He immediately worked to free 
up the media in Azerbaijan and create an environment in which political parties could develop 
and candidates for parliament could get their messages out.  Perhaps a major mistake on his part 
is that, in his attempts to have highly democratic elections, the communist government was left 
in place.  Dissatisfaction with the Nagorno Karabakh crisis, severe economic problems, and 
Russian and Iranian hostility caused him to be driven out, at which time Heydar Aliev came to 
power.  The movement toward democracy that was made during Elcibey’s short-lived rule shows 
that public support for it did exist in among Azerbaijanis. If having a recent attempt at 
democracy makes a state more likely to democratize, Azerbaijan will have a greater chance at 
doing so.  This would enforce the position that now is the time to begin trying to change the 
system in Azerbaijan rather than waiting until later, since it will be easier (or less difficult) to 
break a cycle of authoritarianism now when an attempt at democracy took place in the last fifteen 
years that after the current system has developed further.  Azerbaijan also broke from the Soviet 
Union along with fourteen other countries, many of which are making serious attempts to 
democratize.  If Azerbaijan can develop norms that resemble those of the Baltic States, Ukraine, 
and Georgia rather than the Central Asian states, which are at the opposite end of the spectrum, 
Azerbaijan may be able to find regional support for democracy. 
 Contrasting views have been given as to the level of free media and civil society in  
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Azerbaijan.  Valiyev (2006) paints a bleak portrait of media freedom.  One journalist, he claims, 
was murdered during the 2003 parliamentary elections and the Committee for Journalist Rights 
reported that nearly 80 journalists were beaten, harassed, and detained during protests of the 
Illegitimate election.  He says that the media have been used as an outlet for the government to 
get its positions across or its candidates elected, with 79 percent of the news coverage during the 
2003 election being dedicated to Aliev and his ruling government.  Civil society, from Valiyev’s 
point of view, is very poor.  Political rallies resulted in extreme violence; Human Rights Watch 
reported torture of detainees, including the use of beating, electric shocks, and threats of rape.  
Some detainees were tortured and others reported that they were held in cruel, inhumane, or 
degrading conditions. 
 In contrast, Cornell claims that “an active and diverse opposition, a relatively free press, 
and a vibrant political life exist in Azerbaijan.  Opposition leaders (and the press) criticize the 
regime openly and harshly; they even organize demonstrations and rallies, something that would 
be unthinkable in Central Asia.”  He does say that opposition figures are sued for libel and that 
one public TV channel was suddenly closed (2001, 119).  Valiyev and Cornell describe two very 
different societies in Azerbaijan.  Depending on which observation is accurate, Azerbaijan’s 
prospects for democratization will be much stronger or weaker.  It is critical that norms be 
established throughout Azerbaijan, from the highest tiers of the government to everyday citizens.   
Without a free media and the ability for people to organize protests, demonstrations, opposition 
groups, etc. without the fear of retribution, changing a political system will have no chance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE SECOND STEP TO POLITICAL RESOLUTON:  ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 
AND GROWTH 
 
The second requirement under Kant’s Democratic Peace proposition is that states must become 
economically interdependent.  He argued that interdependence creates incentives for states to do 
whatever they can to prevent war from taking place.   
 Rational Choice theory also plays a powerful role in explaining why states will do 
anything possible to resolve their disputes through peaceful means.  Oneal and Russett (2001) 
write that “the nineteenth century liberal argument derived primarily from the view that 
individuals act rationally in accordance with their own economic interests.  It is hardly in a 
state’s interest to fight another if its citizens sell their goods, obtain imports (raw materials, 
capital goods, intermediate products, or consumer goods), or have financial investments or 
investors there” (129).  This “don’t bite the hand that feeds you” attitude makes perfect sense in 
understanding how states think. Oneal and Russett claim that the theory that economic 
interdependence leads to peace has been around since before the Democratic Peace theory had 
developed.  Not surprisingly, Polachek (1997) found that trade causes peace because states have 
a desire to protect their wealth. 
 In the cases of Armenia and Azerbaijan, if economic interdependence could be achieved, 
both with one another and regionally, odds of a peaceful political solution being developed and 
agreed upon would become much higher.  If interdependence could exist between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, both countries would experience extremely high costs if they allowed war to ensue 
again; on the other hand, major international and domestic benefits could be acquired by 
resolving to come to a political solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  Gartzke, Li, and 
Boehmer (2001) claim that economic interdependence works in promoting peace because it 
 34
allows states to credibly communicate through costly signals using nonviolent means of conflict 
resolution.  They say that states possessing a variety of methods of conflict resolution have less 
need to resort to more destructive and costly techniques.  Results of their study show that 
interdependence does lead to greater peace, even when controlling for the effects of trade, 
democracy, interest, and other variables. 
 Economic interdependence is also important because it could lead to much higher levels 
of economic growth and prosperity domestically.  Citizens who enjoy this prosperity will be less 
likely to support a war that will negatively affect their economies or cause instability in their own 
markets.  After experiencing greater prosperity, they will be more likely to consider and even 
push their leaders for a solution to the issue at stake.  Mousseau, Hegre, and Oneal (2003) found 
that economic interdependence does lead to peace, however only when combined with increased 
economic growth.  They claim that “Whereas economically important trade has important 
pacifying benefits for all dyads, the conflict-reducing effect of democracy is conditional on 
states’ economic development” (300).   
 One particularly hopeful element of the research that has been done on economic 
development is that, while studies seem to suggest overwhelmingly that democracy combined 
with economic interdependence and growth cause higher levels of peace and conflict resolution, 
most of the studies seem to conclude that economic interdependence even when alone leads to 
greater prospects for peace.  These studies suggest that democracy and economic 
interdependence have separate positive effects on peace.  However, it is important that chances 
of peaceful dispute resolution are optimized when both interdependence and democracy exist 
simultaneously.  For this reason, even if Armenia and Azerbaijan began trading with one another 
but neither country democratized, the likelihood of war would be much greater than if both 
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aspects of the Democratic Peace were present.  Without democratization as well, though, norms 
may not be established that would push the countries toward an actual political resolution to the 
territorial dispute.  The result would likely simply ensure a continuance of the status quo. 
 Empirical research on economic interdependence and how it relates to peace shows that 
states that have economically important trade are much more likely to use peaceful means of 
dispute settlement rather than resorting to war when disputes arise.  This will create a much 
higher likelihood that a state will choose a peaceful method of dispute settlement in solving the 
issue.  Whether the means of settlement is formal or informal, there is a higher chance that the 
parties involved will genuinely try to solve the problem rather than merely appear to want to 
achieve resolution, since not doing so may have economic consequences.   
The Current Economic Situation and Prospects for Regional Interdependence 
Armenia has faced significant economic challenges since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.   
The country was already suffering from severe economic problems between 1960 to the end of 
Soviet rule, with Armenia relying on the Soviet Union to sustain its economy.  The Nagorno 
Karabakh war along with a severe earthquake affecting both Armenia and Azerbaijan caused the 
Armenian economy to take an even deeper plunge, leading them into a depression, with unstable 
currency because of the conversion from the ruble to the dram, extremely high inflation rates 
(642.5 percent during the first four months of 1992), and price increases averaging 117 percent a  
month. While economic problems became less severe after Armenia became a member of the 
IMF and World Bank, there is still a high degree of poverty in the country (Sarian 2006).  Now,  
as with Azerbaijan, a small number of corrupt, self-interested government members possess most 
 
of the country’s wealth.   
Azerbaijan suffers from even worse economic conditions than those of Armenia. 
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Rasizade (2003) describes Azerbaijan as a place where most people live below the poverty line.  
Small children can be seen searching through garbage dumps for scraps near mountains they 
have escaped to while the small number of powerful Azeris wear fancy clothes, live in large 
villas, and drive top-of-the-line Mercedes (refusing to yield to pedestrians or traffic signals and 
parking their vehicles on sidewalks, while corrupt cops turn a blind eye).  Rasizade claims that 
economic problems in Azerbaijan are far greater than the worst years of the United States Great 
Depression.  There is an extremely large division between the richest and poorest citizens, the 
education system has deteriorated (about 1/3 of school aged children have to stay home to help 
their parents earn a living), there is very poor sanitation and water supply (only 10 percent of 
cities has a sewage system), and the healthcare system is very poor.  The World Bank, in 2002, 
assessed that 78 percent of the population lives on less than $2 a day and 56 percent lives on less 
than $1. 
Currently, Russia is Armenia’s biggest trading partner, while Turkey and Azerbaijan both 
have trade embargoes on the country.  Armenia’s overwhelming dependence on Russia means 
that Russia has a great deal of leverage against Armenia to get anything it wants.  This power 
enables Russia to prevent any resolution from taking place, which as mentioned earlier in the 
thesis, is probable since ongoing conflict guarantees that Russia maintains control over its sphere 
of influence.  If Turkey and Azerbaijan would completely lift their embargoes on Armenia,  
allowing trade to run freely throughout the region, Russian influence would be minimized, which 
would help the countries involved come to an agreement. 
Now may be the most promising time for Armenia and Turkey to work toward 
 
strengthening relations to where the embargo on Armenia is lifted.  Soghom (2008) claims that 
 
efforts to form peaceful relations between Turkey and Armenia have gained momentum since the 
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collapse of the Soviet Union.  The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan hurt relations with 
Turkey, however, and resulted in Turkey siding with its longtime ally Azerbaijan and instituting 
the trade embargo.  Last September, Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited Armenia for a 
soccer game the two countries competed against one another in.  In November, Armenia’s 
foreign minister Edward Nalbandian urged Turkey to open diplomatic relations with Armenia, 
saying that Armenia was now ready to establish bilateral relations without any preconditions and 
that Armenia expected Turkey to do the same.  He claimed that doing so is in the interest of both 
countries (Radio Free Europe 2008).  Turkey’s foreign minister, during the same month, said that 
it would be holding a three-way meeting to settle long-standing disputes in the Caucasus (RFE 
Nov. 12, 2008).   
 These recent developments show a potential change in course for Armenian/Turkish 
relations that could be very beneficial in the Nagorno Karabakh dispute.  If trade relations 
between Armenia and Turkey are renewed, this interdependence could be very valuable in 
creating a path for eventual political resolution.  Armenia’s economic status could be improved 
dramatically if it was able to trade with Turkey, which could in the future give Turkey the ability 
to push Armenia to take a less hard-line approach to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict by sending 
costly signals.  President Sarkisian is enduring harsh criticism now because of his possible 
willingness to accept a compromise that would call for withdrawal of Armenia from the seven 
areas surrounding Nagorno Karabakh.  An uncompromising stance on Nagorno Karabakh has 
typically been taken not only by the government but by Armenian citizens as well.  Greater 
wealth experienced by Armenian citizens might, as Kant’s work suggested, provide a greater 
sense of urgency to negotiate in order to protect acquired wealth.  If Armenians come to accept a  
compromise with Azerbaijan and begin vocalizing this stance, it will help counterbalance the 
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corrupt government that is now in place, which does not want to see a resolution.   
 It would also be beneficial for Armenia and Azerbaijan to reopen economic relations.  
This interdependence would have the potential of greatly decreasing the level of poverty in 
Azerbaijan, and in addition, might cause President Aliev to take a more moderate approach in 
negotiations.  Economic interdependence would foster communication between the two 
countries, something very important in helping them solve their dispute.   
 Tensions between Armenia and Turkey over the Armenian genocide during the early 
nineteenth century will without doubt hamper relations between the two states.  Armenia is 
pushing for Turkey to acknowledge the genocide, and until this takes place, Turkey’s ability to 
play a positive role in the conflict or push for democratization in Armenia will be limited.  The 
sensitive relationship between Armenia and Turkey runs very deep, and one would expect an 
extremely long recovery process; there must be a starting point, however, and forging a 
constructive dialogue could set stronger relations in motion.  The following chapter on 
international organizations will further discuss Turkey’s role.   
 Azerbaijan removing the trade embargo on Armenia will also be difficult.  Keeping the 
embargo in place may be seen as one of the few areas in which Azerbaijan can try to influence 
Armenia to change its position and withdraw from Azerbaijani territory.  Removal of the 
embargo will also signal to Azerbaijanis that the government is becoming weak on the Karabakh  
issue, so even if Azerbaijan’s leadership was convinced that reopening trade relations was in 
their best interest, they might still choose to not do so because of the domestic opposition  
they would be confronted with.   
 Whether economic relations between these countries ever change, evidence widely 
 
supports the theory that interdependence could only increase the odds that a political solution 
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will eventually be come to pass.  The probability of a political solution will be even greater if 
this interdependence is combined with the norms that come with democracy.  The involvement 
of international organizations has the potential to play a strong role in encouraging these 
changes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS PROMOTERS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
 
International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) comprise the third area in which 
change should occur in order to eventually lead to peaceful political resolution to the Nagorno 
Karabakh dispute.  IGOs could serve a variety of functions in smoothing Armenia/Azerbaijan 
relations.  In fact, they may make up the most important leg of Kant’s tripod.  Unfortunately, 
there are a number of obstacles in this area, many of which will be difficult to overcome. 
 Russett and Oneal (2001) identify a number of valuable benefits that IGOs can provide.  
In Armenia and Azerbaijan’s cases, the most significant benefit these authors cite is that IGOs 
can help socialize states to new norms.  While norm development may be made possible through 
intergovernmental organizations, doing so in Armenia and Azerbaijan will not be an easy task.  
The current political systems and in many ways, cultures of these two states differ dramatically 
with the norms of modern democracies.  To make changes in this area could take a long time and 
will without doubt require a major increase in the sense of urgency felt by international 
organizations and their member states.  In addition to socializing the disputing parties to new 
norms, Russett and Oneal argue that IGOs have the ability to try to coerce states to abide by 
norms once they have been developed.  If Armenia and Azerbaijan ever succeed in 
democratizing, especially if they do so with the help of international organizations, those 
international organizations have a great ability to help ensure that states do not slide back into 
authoritarianism.  Going back to rational choices, international organizations often offer a 
number of valuable rewards for states.  States will be much more likely to remain democratic if 
leaders feel that there are direct interests involved in doing so; the probability would likely 
increase substantially if citizens begin to feel its advantages and start to apply pressure on their 
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governments.  In the corrupt political climate of Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is crucial that strong 
organizations in which the two states obtain a high degree of interests are active in the process.  
Extensive costs, including damaging financial consequences to major reputational losses would 
be rendered by failing to thoroughly consolidate democracy, which will help persuade states to 
abide by norms.   
These compliance costs could provide some explanatory power to the findings of 
Mitchell and Hensel (2002), who found strong support for their hypothesis that states have much 
higher rates of compliance when international organizations are involved in conflict resolution.  
Mitchell and Hensel found that 94.4% (17 of 18) of agreements reached with the involvement of 
an international organization were carried out by both claimants, as opposed to the two-thirds of 
agreements arrived at without IGO assistance.  Although this study is related to compliance with 
agreements in territorial and river disputes, if compliance with these agreements is based on 
adherence to norms due to assessment of the costs and benefits of reneging, states may feel 
equally compelled to follow through on democratization, if IGOs are deeply involved.  Of 
course, it is important to acknowledge that an agreement to democratize, which will likely be 
more informal, will not have such high costs as not complying with a legal territorial dispute 
judgment.  Nevertheless, if international organizations can build a sense that abiding by 
democratic norms serves the domestic interests in Armenia and Azerbaijan, there will be an 
increased likelihood of democratic transition and consolidation. 
The Current Status of IGOs in the Karabakh Dispute and Problems in 
Democratization and Political Resolution 
 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), formerly the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became effective January 1, 
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2005.5 
 
More specifically, a sub-group called the Minsk Group has played a specialized role in 
mediating the dispute. Throughout the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the OSCE has been the only 
IGO playing a significant role in the conflict, but arguably has had minimal success and suffers 
from a number of institutional deficiencies.  Without correcting these problems, the OSCE will 
have great difficulty solving conflicts and creating norms.   
The OSCE was and remains the only organization working with Armenia and Azerbaijan 
to mediate a cease-fire.  The OSCE is made up of 54 member states, and unlike organizations 
such as the European Union in which member states are let in by adhering to certain proscribed 
norms, the OSCE is made up of a very heterogeneous mixture of states, which can result in 
minimized efficiency in taking progressive actions.   
During the mediation process, Russia was not only playing a role in the OSCE but also 
making its own attempts to broker a cease fire between the disputants (without the knowledge of 
the OSCE), which in the end Russia succeeded in doing.  One of this organization’s most 
debilitating problems is that most of its efforts require consensus among all members, not just a 
majority of them.  This paralyzes any serious efforts by the organization to truly have an effect 
on the conflict since there is always a member that is not in agreement on a course of action.  In 
the case of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, Russia consistently undermined efforts that could 
have had a positive influence on conflict resolution.   Freire (2003) claims that Russia acted 
jealously toward the OSCE’s involvement in the conflict, charging the organization with 
intruding upon Russian interests.  Russia publicly claimed support for the OSCE and Minsk 
                                                 
5 The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe became the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe after the November 1994 Budapest Summit.  The change in name had 
no effect on the nature of the organization, but was made for ‘symbolic reasons (Friere 2003). 
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Group but in reality has been extremely threatened by outside involvement.  The state frequently 
tried to halt OSCE efforts, sometimes with success; however, Freire does note that there are 
areas where Russia’s veto power within the organization is limited. 
Another critical area in which change must take place in order for the OSCE to have any 
significant effect is that it must increase its financial resources.  Freire claims that the 
organization is working within an extremely limited budget, which has resulted in a lack of 
adequately trained personnel; because the OSCE cannot afford to pay employees reasonable 
salaries, many employees leave the organization for higher paying jobs.  This has also created 
problems in sending people off to field missions, and even when people can be deployed to these 
missions, they are often inadequately trained.  Although Russia does have veto power in 
preventing the OSCE from taking on field missions, in order to influence norms that could lead 
to democracy, a well-trained force will be necessary to monitor and ensure that democratization 
takes place. 
Thus far, the OSCE’s prerogatives in Nagorno Karabakh and elsewhere do not seem to 
place a more than minimal amount of importance on democratization.  On the OSCE’s Website, 
its page devoted to democratization activities goes no farther than the following brief statement: 
 The OSCE brings people together across borders at a professional level to discuss  
 issues and develop capacities necessary for the construction of democratic  
 culture.  The Organization’s activities are aimed at all aspects of democracy,  
 including methods of governance, participation of women and men in political 
 life, respect for the rule of law and the development of transparent legislation 
 that meets OSCE commitments and other international standards. 
The lack of any specific examples or procedures the OSCE can or is taking to promote 
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democracy reveals the organization’s limited focus given to government transformation.  Little 
information can be found on any ways in which the OSCE has worked with either Armenia or 
Azerbaijan on democratic norm building.  Under the OSCE, the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) claims to be focused more on democratization, however 
this group seems to be more interested in the human rights dimension of the organization, with 
its democratization efforts being a byproduct of the human rights agenda.  Nevertheless, Bothe, 
Ronzitti, and Rosas (1997) claim that the ODIHR works to build democratic institutions and 
judicial systems as well as a strong rule of law.  It offers OSCE states diplomatic, academic, 
legal and administrative expertise.  Its methods of achieving these objectives are through 
organizing small regional and country-oriented meetings, seminars and training programs for 
civil servants, judges, lawyers, journalists, and the public at large.  The main function that the 
ODIHR provides, however, is election monitoring, something essential; yet elections are only 
one aspect of democracy and even free and fair elections will be difficult if deeper cultural traits 
that accept democracy do not develop in Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
The OSCE cannot be influential in any aspect of Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s problems if 
the states belonging to it fail to make the Karabakh dispute and democratization high priorities.  
Yet, during the course of OSCE and Minsk Group involvement in the dispute, member states 
have taken no more than minimal interest in trying to work out a solution to the conflict.  
Maresca (1996) argues that a major reason that no political resolution to the Karabakh issue has 
been developed is that western members of the Minsk Group did not sustain high-level interest.  
During perhaps the most important meeting of the Minsk Group during negotiations when the 
war between Armenia and Azerbaijan persisted, the Chairman of the group did not even attend 
the meeting, citing family obligations.  Instead of attend, he had his statement read at the meeting 
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by his deputy.  In addition, the chairman was an unknown and inexperienced Italian politician 
that could not speak any of the languages the negotiations were being spoken in (French, 
English, and Russian).  Also, representatives negotiating the conflict for western countries were 
all low-level diplomats that showed no interest in the negotiations.  Amazingly, after missing a 
major turning point in the negotiations process, one diplomat apologized for being absent, his 
excuse being that he had to go home to walk his dog.  Maresca also claims that there was no 
official United States position for a representative in the Minsk Group.  The person who did 
represent the United States was expected to do the job as a collateral duty while being assigned 
to another full-time position.  He had only one assistant, who often had to be absent, which 
surprised other diplomats since the United States typically sends fairly large delegations to even 
minor disputes (482). 
The OSCE and organizations within the OSCE like the ODIHR are critical if 
democratization is to ever take place in Armenia and Azerbaijan.  If the United States and the 
many other western OSCE member states cannot make genuine efforts to promote conflict 
resolution, even during the height of a highly fatal and potentially regionally devastating war, it 
is difficult to imagine these states accepting the roles required to assist in democratic norm-
building.  Only two countries in the region surrounding Armenia and Azerbaijan possess at least 
a moderate level of democratic institutions (Georgia and Turkey, and even these states’ 
adherence to democratic principles is often questioned); therefore, western states, and more 
geographically proximate European states in particular, must take the initiative to push 
democratization.  Even when taking a purely realist stance on the issue, it is somewhat surprising 
that the U.S. and western countries have put such little effort into trying to solve problems in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Renewed conflict could destabilize a region in the backdoor of the 
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Middle East, specifically Iran, which the U.S. fears is working toward becoming a nuclear state.  
Preventing conflict in the Caucasus would seem to be in the direct interests of the United States 
and Western Europe.  Also, interestingly, based on the neoconservative philosophy that states 
throughout the Middle East should be democratized, which has (supposedly) determined policy 
during the Bush administration, one would easily think that the United States would have made 
democratization in a region so close to the Middle East a high priority.   
The fact that the United States has taken such a strong disinterest in playing a major role 
in Armenia and Azerbaijan is unfortunate, because if the U.S. was to change its position it could 
be a powerful force in the conflict resolution and possibly democratization process as well.  As 
discussed in the chapter on democratization, the United States is the least biased actor among 
OSCE states in the eyes of both states.  The close relationship the United States has with both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan gives it greater legitimacy to help teach norms.  It would be beneficial if 
the United States would be given and accept much more responsibility in norm developing 
activities in the OSCE.  The United States often resists getting overly involved in disputes of 
countries within the Soviet sphere of influence, probably because it does not want Russia 
intruding upon United States interests.  If the United States did choose to take greater measures 
to influence the Caucasus, Russian domination, which has and will continue to work to the long-
term disadvantages of Caucasus states, will be balanced.  If Russia perceived the United States to 
be intruding upon Russia’s regional influence or felt threatened by U.S. actions within their 
region, reciprocal actions could be taken by Russia that threaten the United States or our 
interests.  Unless there is a significant danger in the post-Soviet space, it may be unlikely for the 
United States to exert itself there.  Either way, the United States stands the greatest chance within 
the OSCE of making progress toward democratization and political resolution.  Without the U.S. 
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as well as other Western countries, democratic norm development and development of a norm in 
which states believe in making attempts to resolve conflict peacefully will be left to the largely 
undemocratic post-Soviet states.   
Regional Organizations 
Regional organizations are often extremely useful in helping states to move toward and 
consolidate democracy.  Because of the geopolitical landscape surrounding Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, regional organizations may be the least likely method by which democratic norms 
will be supported.  The two countries are surrounded by a preponderance of authoritarian 
regimes whose laws are frequently based on the principles of Islam.  Iran and Turkey are on the 
southern border.  To the east of Azerbaijan is Central Asia, which includes Islamic theocracies 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.  To the north is Russia, and 
to the west is Georgia.  Among these countries, not one represents a very strong example of 
democracy.  Russia claims to be democratic,  but undemocratic characteristics such as a very low 
degree of civil society and basic rights such as freedom of speech and press are a significant 
problem.  These issues contribute to highly flawed and undemocratic elections since the 
government manipulates the media to influence public opinion to favor a given candidate, 
suppresses those who wish to organize any type of opposition, and often assassinates journalists 
challenging its leadership.  In addition, Russia’s role in neighboring states is not one that 
necessarily nurtures democracy and peace, but rather exerts itself as a state interested only in 
heightening its own interests, even at the expense of stability and democracy. Russia’s example 
of democracy is so poor that it could do more to dissuade Armenia and Azerbaijan to 
democratize than to persuade them to do so. 
Pevehouse (2002) researched how international organizations affect the likelihood of 
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democratization and found that international organizations have a strong impact on democratic 
transitions, but the likelihood that a democratic transition will take place greatly increases as the 
number of democracies in the international organization increases, even when controlling for 
domestic issues.  In another study, Pevehouse (2002) provides support for his argument that 
regional international organizations have a positive effect on democratization if the organization 
is comprised of a large number of institutionalized democracies.  Given these results, it is clear 
that a valuable asset to pressing democratization would be to have a regional organization that 
took an interest in democratizing the Caucasus states.  Unfortunately, there is no regional 
organization that could successfully teach strong democratic norms.  Regional organizations 
could do very little without the involvement of Russia, also, which would use them to further 
promote its own personal interests.  If any organization could sustain itself without Russian 
involvement, which is doubtful, it might be beneficial for post-soviet countries such as Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, and Ukraine, which have all been much more successful in implementing 
democracies to form an organization under the principle of promoting democracy.  
The European Union:  The International Organization that Needs to Play a Greater 
Role 
 
The European Union, though it has not played a serous role in the Nagorno Karabakh dispute, 
may have greater potential for success in norm development and eventual political resolution 
than any other international organization, including the OSCE.  A number of structural and 
philosophical aspects of the EU give it more power to influence states than the OSCE.   
 First, in order to assist in the construction of new norms, an organization must have 
excellent financial resources.    Youngs (2004) writes that the commission’s European Initiative 
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) had 100 million Euros at its disposal by the end of 
the 1990s.  This, he claims, made the commission a much more powerful multilateral actor than 
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the OSCE, whose budget is under 20 million per year.  Norm development and democracy 
promotion is a difficult enough task, but will be impossible without enough financial support to 
consistently fund activities.  Even if the OSCE decided it wanted to begin supporting democracy, 
it does not have the ability to take the drastic measures necessary to promote democratic norms. 
 The EU also has a far greater ability to nurture economic interdependence than the 
OSCE.  Economic interdependence between Armenia and Azerbaijan and EU states is in all of 
these actor’s interests.  The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and South Caucasus pipelines increase the 
means by which Europe and Caucasus states can trade.  German (2009) claims that European 
states want to diversify their oil supply so they will not be dependent upon any single country.  
Also, since Europe’s own oil supply is declining but demand is rising, it is expected that by 2020 
the EU will be importing two-thirds of its oil. Heightened interdependence between these states 
and the EU is much more beneficial than increasing interdependence within the post-Soviet 
region since European states actually have the ability, as well as resources, to push Armenia and 
Azerbaijan toward democratization.  By strengthening trade links between Europe and the 
Caucasus, increased growth is likely to occur in Armenia and Azerbaijan.  As a result of 
increased growth, costs of not democratizing will be extremely high as well as the costs of 
allowing authoritarian regimes to reemerge after democratization has began.  Increased EU-
Caucasus trade will make democratization of greater interest to the disputing states. 
 As of now, there is an imbalance in the degree of trade between each of the two disputing 
states and the EU.  Azerbaijan has a clear trade advantage over Armenia due to its oil reserves.  
German (2007) claims that because of Azerbaijan’s energy security and geographic location, the 
EU often turns a blind eye to democratic shortcomings.  On the other hand, because Armenia has  
so much to gain from EU trade relations but much less to offer in return, the EU has powerful 
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leverage in pushing democratic conditions.   
 Unlike the OSCE, which puts very little emphasis on democratization, the European 
Union places high importance on democratic institutions as being necessary for achieving 
conflict resolution.  However, as with the OSCE, few concrete plans exist for how democratic 
norm infusion could be implemented.  Youngs writes that European Security and Defense Policy 
(EDSP) officials admit that little thought has yet gone into the way that EU missions might 
support institution-building aims (2004, 532).6  The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is the 
most specific way in which the EU is attempting to promote democratization in countries outside 
its domain.  The ENP has taken a direct interest in democratization in the Caucasus states.  The 
EU’s external relations commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner believes that stable democratic 
development must be encouraged from within a country, not by forcing democracy on it from 
outside, and that by encouraging stable democratic development, the ENP can play a key role in 
conflict resolution.  She says that “through promoting democracy and regional cooperation, 
boosting national reform programs and improving the socio-economic prospects of the region, it 
can contribute to a more positive climate for conflict settlement” (German 2007, 360).  While 
some broad specifics are mentioned here, the question of “how” norms will be developed is not 
provided.  How will the ENP promote democracy and regional cooperation?  What kind of 
national reform programs will help countries currently very skeptical about democracy accept 
this new type of government?  How will the organization improve socio-economic prospects?  
And the question that is not asked, How will the ENP persuade government officials who have 
amassed great wealth and power from the status quo to support democracy?  In order for the 
European Union or the OSCE to have success in democratization, these questions must be 
                                                 
6 The EDSP is an organization falling within the European Union that deals with conflict 
prevention and crisis management.   
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answered.  Kriesberg (1996) suggests the use of frequent workshops as a beneficial means of 
conflict resolution, citing their usefulness in situations in the past such as in Bosnia.  Workshops, 
if given on a constant basis and used to familiarize regular Armenian and Azerbaijani citizens, 
rather than just governments, with democratic principles could be very valuable.  This would 
require large financial sacrifices by the European Union and the development of well thought out 
programs that after implementation, would be assessed frequently on their effectiveness and 
revised if necessary.   
The EU also could play a vital role in pushing democratization by using Turkey’s desire 
for EU accession to get the country to try to alter its current role in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations 
and to open trade relations with Armenia.  As discussed in the chapter on economic 
interdependence, strengthening relations between Turkey and Armenia will be very difficult, but 
the EU has a greater chance than any other state or organization to convince Turkey to lift the 
embargo on Armenia.  This shows the very close link that international organizations can have 
on economic interdependence and democracy.  Turkey could have an even greater impact on 
Azerbaijan, which will be better persuaded by a state such as Turkey to which it shares close 
identity ties, than Western states.  Although Azerbaijan has close connections with Western 
states, it has very little in common with them.  Even if Turkey and Armenia fail to improve 
relations, if it works with Azerbaijan alone to promote democratic norms, the likelihood of 
democratic transition will improve. 
IGOs and the Need for Members to Coordinate Efforts 
 
One significant problem among international organizations and the states that belong to 
them is that states have competing agendas about how to deal with the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict.  In any conflict, it is crucial that those involved in mediating the conflict be on the same 
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page rather than attempting to undermine the efforts of one another.  The need for cohesion 
among players is particularly important in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, since contrasting 
positions allow Armenia and Azerbaijan to be as indecisive in their own positions as mediating 
states are in their positions.  As long as states are either apathetic or use the Nagorno Karabakh 
crisis to strengthen their own interests rather than aligning with other states to come to an agreed 
upon plan of action, the disputing countries will continue to stall any political resolution. 
The consensus requirement with the OSCE creates an obstacle that is likely to make 
contrasting opinions more visible to Armenia and Azerbaijan, thus creating a perception of 
uncertainty about whether a solution is valuable.  Having a variety of opinions might work in a 
legal dispute settlement scenario, but in an informal process such as the one that has taken place 
so far, differing views give disputants room to manipulate the situation to their own advantage.  
Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) argue that it is particularly damaging when there is 
more than one powerful mediator in a dispute that have diverging preferences, reporting a 15 
percent increase in the likelihood of a militarized dispute in these cases.  Russia tends to take a 
similar general position as the United States on the issue; however, these two countries as well as 
the others often have varying ideas concerning how to solve the matter.  Boehmer, Gartzke, and 
Nordstrom do, on the bright side, find that IGOs have an impact independent of major powers.   
If states involved in the OSCE would combine their efforts with the goal of 
democratization, norm development would have much greater chances.  Because of the large 
number of OSCE members and their varying individual levels of democratic achievement, it may 
be difficult for this organization to be a positive role model in norm development.  The European 
Union, on the flipside, requires very high levels of institutionalized democracy and strong human 
rights records before states are permitted to join.  Its membership is much more homogeneous 
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and is much more likely to render agreement on plans of action, especially since its members 
also have more similar economic and security interests. Therefore, this organization might be 
better suited to export democratic norms.   
 
International organizations play a very important role in Kant’s tripod because they have such a 
high level of impact on both economic interdependence and democracy.  These last two elements 
of the tripod could, reciprocally, cause states to join more international organizations, creating 
higher levels of growth and democratic practices, but in states such as Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
economic interdependence and democracy are not going to come about without a strong, 
adequately funded, coordinated effort by powerful organizations perceived as having  
credibility.  For interdependence, and much more so, democracy to occur, Armenia’s and 
Azerbaijan’s identities must transform, which is not possible without outside help. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION:  IS DEMOCRATIC PEACE POSSIBLE? 
 
Although it is clear that consolidated democracy, economic interdependence, and international 
organizations create a much higher probability that Armenia and Azerbaijan will work to 
peacefully resolve their dispute, it is much less clear whether these factors are possible. 
Realistically, the odds of any of these requirements coming to fruition seem fairly small.   
 Changing a state’s norms requires altering people’s identities.  Unlike many newer states, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan are both very old, with identities that took a long time to become what 
they are today.  Armenia, in addition, has had the experience of having been largely destroyed by 
the Turks, and are determined to retain who they are.  Being farther geographically from Europe 
than post-Soviet states such as the Baltic States and Ukraine, the Caucasus states have, naturally, 
had a more difficult time seeing the benefits of democratization.  Due to its location, Russia is 
able to create a barrier between the Caucasus states and democratic, Western ones.   
 Interdependence and international organization’s actions would create a much greater 
likelihood of democratization and political resolution to the Nagorno Karabakh dispute, but both 
of these will be made much more difficult because of Russia.  Russia is not going to stand idly 
by and allow its hegemonic status within the region to be threatened, and any decreased 
dependence on Russia by Caucasus states will mean a decrease in power by Russia.  Azerbaijan 
already tries to limit Russian influence, and after the Georgian debacle in August, 2008, it has 
lost influence in Georgia as well.  Armenia has been a consistent ally of Russia, largely because 
of its dependence upon the state.  If the trade embargo between Armenia and Turkey comes to an 
end, or if diplomatic relations begin again, Russia will lose a large amount of control over 
Armenia and its presence in the Caucasus will be threatened.  The EU can put pressure on  
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Turkey to make these moves; however, Turkey will without doubt receive pressure from Russia 
to continue the status quo.   
 International organizations will also have a difficult time playing a strong role in creating 
norms.  The OSCE will continue to be limited in playing any significant role because Russia will 
use its veto power to prevent any serious activities on the part of the OSCE, and will prevent 
OSCE employees from going into the field to work on democratic norm development just as  
it has, in the past, put down efforts by the OSCE to send in peacekeeping missions.   
 Furthermore, attempting to establish democratic norms in the Caucasus will require 
significant financial sacrifices by international organizations and the states that belong to them.  
These states may very well feel as if their financial contributions would be better spent 
elsewhere, or at least be very hesitant to offer the amount of money necessary to have a real 
chance for success.  Looking at the OSCE’s website, the organization seems to be much more 
active in efforts in places like the Balkan States than in the Caucasus.  There is also no chance 
that there will be the consensus required in OSCE decision-making to enable them to fund and 
approve field missions for the purpose of working toward democratization, and even if there was, 
the OSCE’s entire 20 million dollar annual budget might not be adequate to fund a widespread 
and comprehensive program that would teach democratic norms in two countries.   
On a more positive side, the European Union is likely to want to make large-scale 
financial investments in areas where it expects to reap rewards for itself.  As oil becomes scarcer, 
the need to find reliable alternative sources of petroleum will become more important.  Importing 
oil from the Caspian area will enable EU states to bypass both Russia and Iran, creating a larger 
incentive for the organization to make democratization efforts a higher priority.  Of course, if the 
EU can secure oil without making a large financial investment, it may try to  
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avoid funding democratization programs.  Economic benefits the European Union could provide 
Caucasus states through its European Neighborhood Policy program could be a substantial 
incentive for Azerbaijan to make oil easily accessible for EU states.  Also, if the EU chose to 
hone in on Azerbaijan only, rather than working with Armenia as well, the situation could 
become worse instead of better.  If the EU becomes desperate to find new oil sources, corrupt 
leaders in Azerbaijan may be able to get the EU (and other countries, for that matter) to overlook 
any restrictions on political rights or human rights as has been the case with Saudi Arabia and the 
international community.  A disproportionate level of wealth and military capabilities between 
the two countries could cause the conflict to be revived, since Azerbaijan would then stand a 
chance at reclaiming its vast amount of lost territory.  This would create a very volatile situation 
within the region.  If the EU really wants to secure oil, however, it will have to push for stability 
within the Caucasus.  EU countries should be aware that helping Azerbaijan surpass Armenia’s 
level of wealth will cause instability that will jeopardize European oil interests.  This might give 
the EU more reasons to get involved by funding democratization programs in both countries.   
It is also important to not forget that, in a way, the people of Nagorno Karabakh are a 
third party to the dispute itself, and the Karabakh peoples have been extremely uncompromising 
in finding a solution to the dispute.  The Nagorno Karabakh people are not considered by any 
mediating states or organizations to be an actual party to the dispute.7  For this reason, the 
Karabakh people have been left out of the negotiating process.  In the Minsk negotiations, the 
Karabakh people were represented not as a party but as an observer to the process.  Armenia has 
                                                 
7 Armenia is the only state that has claimed in the past that Nagorno Karabakh was an actual 
party of the territorial dispute.  Armenia, despite its consistent role as a primary party in 
negotiations and its direct support of the Karabakh peoples goals to either become independent 
or join Armenia, has argued that it is not even part of the dispute; rather, Armenia has claimed 
that the dispute was between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. 
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said in the past that it would not support any agreement that the Karabakh people did not consent 
to.  Thus even if democratization, economic interdependence, and better efforts by international 
organizations all take place, the people of Nagorno Karabakh may be a debilitating factor in 
coming up with a political solution.  If Armenia ceases its political and financial support of  
Karabakh, however, these people will be forced to accept any reasonable deal made between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan.   
 Right now, of course, there are no concerted efforts to truly try to democratize either 
Armenia or Azerbaijan.  Because of the autocratic leadership in both countries, it may be highly 
doubtful that a solution will take place.  Evidence on the benefits of institutionalized democracy, 
trade, and international organizations all show significantly higher rates of peace and genuine 
attempts at solving problems when these factors are present.  Unfortunately, all of these are 
currently very weak at this point.  This is a strong cause for concern since, as I have stated 
previously, Armenia’s president is looking at an aggressive political solution that would call for 
Armenians to cede the Azerbaijan territory outside Nagorno Karabakh and, after a waiting 
period, to consider a political solution that would at least grant Karabakh large-scale autonomy, 
though not sovereignty.  Naturally, this does not sit well with Armenian citizens or the rest of the 
government.  If Sarkisian tries to go through with an agreement against the will of his people or 
the government, he may be overthrown with a more uncompromising president taking over.  If 
he is able to go through with this agreement in the current climate, these two countries’ worst 
days might be ahead of them, not behind.  International organizations and individual states  
should be very cautious in the roles they play in the situation.  It will be very interesting to see 
what the future holds for Armenia and Azerbaijan.   
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